Data Sharing, AML/CFT & Data Privacy: 2018, Together at Last?

Happy and healthy 2018 to all!

In this series of blog posts, I will discuss FATF’s November 2017 Guidance on Private Sector Information Sharing.  I am happy to say that the Guidance addresses many of the points I noted in my 2016 SWIFT Institute paper on AML/CTF and data privacy (e.g. cross-border data protection law, how confidentiality can forbid group sharing).

The FATF Guidance is a welcome development and seems to be part of a shift in thinking towards more favorable attitudes regarding data governance among AML/CFT professionals that I have personally noted in the past year. This is probably due to a host of factors including the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) constantly being in the headlines, the rise of cooperative public-private groups such as the UK’s Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) and US’s FinCEN Exchange, Brexit, and developments in Fintech.

Building off its 2016 efforts, this FATF Guidance puts information sharing on the map in committing its governments to implement agendas to meet these goals.  The Guidance tells the private sector that states consider data sharing an internal and group priority.  Hopefully, it will provide financial institutions with enough confidence to contribute to forming the standards necessary so data sharing (public-private and private-private) can effectively balance market and national security interests.  FATF emphasizes this throughout the text, noting that putting the guidelines into practice requires public and private views and expertise.  Notably, FATF adds data privacy authorities to the Guidance’s intended audience alongside governments and financial institutions, thereby recognizing the importance of these views to the goal.

However, as is typical of any international group’s stance on a globally complicated issue with conditions that change according to jurisdiction, FATF guidance can only provide guideposts – it does not, and cannot, furnish the detailed governance and operational processes that regulators and financial institutions need.  This is not a criticism, but a reminder of the role and limitations of these Guidances and how much work there is yet to be done by national authorities and the private sector.*

FATF confirmed the widely-held belief that information sharing is essential to a “well-functioning AML/CFT framework.” In forthcoming posts, I will expand on three thematic streams within the Guidance;

  1. Data protection and privacy and AML/CFT are not mutually exclusive
  2. Financial institutions must share data internally and across the group
  3. Effective data sharing is only possible with public-private and private-private cooperation. (Recognizing the sometime cyclical cycle that public-private groups are “source as well as target of information flow.”)

All while noting that two conditions pervade all of the above;

  • Siloed views are not effective
  • Technology and governance are intertwined

I am looking forward to getting on the blog wagon again and seeing how the data sharing regime develops.  A thank you to everyone who has been supportive of my work on this topic over the years. Keep engaging – there’s more to come in 2018.

Cheers!

*Having said this, I hope the Wolfsberg Group follows suit and completes its 2014 guidance on AML/CFT and data privacy.

 

**This blog represents my personal opinions and does not represent LexisNexis Risk Solutions.  My research is my personal intellectual property and has been in no way influenced by any member of the financial services community or by government officials.

Good-bye 2016: To 2018

Happy New Year (a bit early)! 2016 was quite an exciting and busy year with many personal and professional transitions that left little time for blogging.  However, I’m back with insights as the financial services and authorities work throughout 2017 to implement the AML/CTF and data protection legislation and agreements for 2018.

Before I discuss recent developments in the field, I’d like to comment on the release of my SWIFT Institute-sponsored paper on US-EU AML/CTF & Privacy for Multinational Banks,* which was published in August (download here). The Institute also invited me to speak about it at Sibos in Geneva, Switzerland in September (download slides here).

My experience with the Institute has been fantastic. A sincere thank you to Peter Ware and Nancy Murphy for their kindness, professionalism, and support for independent research that allows academics to reach practitioners with meaningful analysis.**

19 AML/CTF & Data Privacy Compliance Conflicts Graphic from the Paper (Caution: Not as Impressive as SWIFT’s interactive graphic!)

I highly recommend that you visit the Institute’s fabulous interactive graphic for an overview of the 19 compliance conflicts (view here).

Don’t forget to read the last section of the paper that covers Profiling! It lives in all 19 issues and impacts every single AML/CTF compliance function.

About the paper:

The paper is a primer for financial institutions and policy-makers to identify 19 legal conflicts that may affect a multinational’s ability to comply with the AML/CTF and privacy regimes.  I hope that this information enables private actors to understand how their internal processes may expose them to regulatory risk; for public actors, I hope it provides a better understanding of the challenges the private sector faces in multi-jurisdictional compliance, but especially how these issues affect the quality of data that private corporations ultimately provide to authorities to achieve the end goal – combating financial crime and political violence.

As one can imagine, there was not enough space for an analysis of all the dimensions or actors involved, so a few things to note;

  • The US Terrorist Financing Tracking Program (TFTP) demands a paper of its own due to developments regarding the development of an EU TFTS.
  • I shelved an anonymous AML/CTF & Privacy survey due to an insufficient data sample. I will conduct the survey again, but the preliminary results demonstrated a clear US and EU divide.  Respondents did highlight AML/CTF and data protection concerns when dealing with high risk third country areas.
  • Section 3.2 on Public-Private cooperation could have been a paper onto itself (and may appear as a forthcoming chapter). Multinationals face tough decisions when they operate in multiple countries where they must comply with data requests from authorities.

The Takeaway

Despite the difficulties ahead, in the paper’s conclusions, I state that the financial services should be acting now to align their data protection obligations in 4AMLD to the GDPR.

4AMLD and the GDPR consistently refer to ‘safeguards’ for data processing, but these safeguards are ultimately left up to EU Member State law, so the diversity among EU Member State law will continue.  The GDPR formally calls for cooperation among industry associations to formulate “codes of conduct” to set the technical and organizational standards outlined in the Regulation.  Article 38 (40 and 41 in final version) outlines the codes’ provisions, which are broad enough to accommodate compliance’s risk-based regime, including secure systems and fair and transparent data processing for legitimate interests.

The private sector should work with Member States to create AML/CTF & privacy-centric ‘codes of conduct’ that harmonize with these developing national safeguards .

I’ll be posting updates on those efforts as I become aware of them.

Have a healthy and safe 2017!

Want to learn more?  Join me on 22 February 2017 for a webinar on Nomoneylaundering.com 

Still to Come:
4AMLD Amendments (aka 5AMLD) and the GDPR impact

*Paper referrals to EU legislation predate the final version of the GDPR and the articles and recitals may have changed.

**This blog represents my personal opinions and does not represent LexisNexis Risk Solutions.  My research is my personal intellectual property and has been in no way influenced by any member of the financial services community or by government officials.

The “Weaponization of Finance” is more than Sanctions – It’s Data

I am always happy when I see people address the links between finance and security because it is so rare.

Last month, Daniel Drezner, of Tufts University and the Brookings Institute, wrote about the “hard limits of economic statecraft” regarding the use of sanctions against Russia’s actions in the Ukraine (interview here too).  This week, Ian Bremmer and Cliff Kupchan, of the Eurasia Group listed “The Weaponization of Finance” as a “Top Risk of 2015.”

Bremmer and Kupchan correctly assert that the US’s global financial position affords American policymakers powerful means to influence behaviors beyond its borders.  Specifically, they note access to capital markets and sanctions as “tools of coercive diplomacy.”  They cite the US influence on norms in international organizations, the dollar’s role as the premier reserve and investment currency, and the vulnerability of the private banking sector to cyber-attack as further evidence of its power resources.

Sanctions deserve a place in the statecraft toolbox, but as Business Insider’s @elenaholodny summarized, it is difficult to employ successfully (See also David Baldwin’s classic Economic Statecraft, Meghan O’Sullivan Shrewd Sanctions, Cortright and Lopez Smart Sanctions, and Drezner’s own Sanctions Paradox).

Restricting the use of finance to sanctions limits its value to foreign affairs. The technological revolution in banking, which has ditigialized the industry, finance’s multinational presence, and the increase in recordkeeping and reporting requirements after 9/11 and the 2008 crisis, has provided policymakers with an opportunity to harness financial data to map behaviors, networks of violence, and illicit economies across borders.

The Eurasia Group hints to this, “The United States is expanding its ability to track the financial transactions [my emphasis] of government leaders of concern, as well as their state and private sector allies, in order to close their access to capital and property.”

But governments use financial data for more than sanctions. They do it to detect weaknesses in the system and to track networks of illicit crime and political violence.

Thus, financial data’s ability to help map networks of behavior when combined with other types of information mean that finance’s role in foreign policy extends well beyond economics.

That is, of course, if government agencies can acquire that data – legally or otherwise.

I argue (briefly explained here and here) that financial data intelligence is one example of a new type of statecraft suited to the digital age; Information Statecraft – the attempt to influence through the acquisition, control, or presentation of data, information, or knowledge.

However, financial data isn’t solely held by governments; it’s held by private financial institutions, which presents numerous challenges to using financial data for sanctions or other policies.  Bremmer and Kupchan also allude to this point – “the weaponization of finance is a tool that can be use with minimal cooperation from other governments.”  While it oversimplifies the relationships involved, it does highlight the importance of private sector compliance.

Financial institutions have always treasured data for their own purposes, but now states are demanding they record, maintain, and report more of it to authorities (e.g. FATF recommendations for Politically Exposed Persons, Beneficial Ownership, Know Your Customer rules, Suspicious Action/Activity Reports, among others). For decades, and more so after 9/11, governments expect bankers to be AML/CTF sentinels, which is very far from their primary business, to make money.

The weaponization of finance is real, and has been evolving for a while.  We need to expand our views of statecraft to accommodate the new realities of the digital world, and this is especially true of the relationship between finance and foreign policy.